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Abstract—To launch black-box attacks against a Deep Neural
Network (DNN) based Face Recognition (FR) system, one needs
to build substitute models to simulate the target model, so the
adversarial examples discovered from substitute models could
also mislead the target model. Such transferability is achieved
in recent studies through querying the target model to obtain
data for training the substitute models. A real-world target, likes
the FR system of law enforcement, however, is less accessible to
the adversary. To attack such a system, a substitute model with
similar quality as the target model is needed to identify their
common defects. This is hard since the adversary often does
not have the enough resources to train such a powerful model
(hundreds of millions of images and rooms of GPUs are needed
to train a commercial FR system).
We found in our research, however, that a resource-
constrained adversary could still effectively approximate the tar-
get model’s capability to recognize specific individuals, by training
biased substitute models on additional images of those victims
whose identities the attacker want to cover or impersonate. This
is made possible by a new property we discovered, called Nearly
Local Linearity (NLL), which models the observation that an ideal
DNN model produces the image representations (embeddings)
whose distances among themselves truthfully describe the human
perception of the differences among the input images. By simu-
lating this property around the victim’s images, we significantly
improve the transferability of black-box impersonation attacks by
nearly 50%. Particularly, we successfully attacked a commercial
system trained over 20 million images, using 4 million images
and 1/5 of the training time but achieving 62% transferability in
an impersonation attack and 89% in a dodging attack.
I. INTRODUCTION
With its commercial success, Deep Learning (DL) based
Face Recognition (FR) is haunted by the security risks posed
by the adversary who have already been adaptive to the AI
innovation. Prior research shows that adversarial examples
can be found to mislead even the state-of-the-art recognition
algorithms [4], [7], [27], [29], causing them to misclassify
these examples. More specifically, such adversarial examples
are images derived from adding perturbation on normal im-
ages, for the purpose of inducing classification errors while
maintaining the level of changes low so they can appear less
distinguishable from the original images by humans. Indeed,
a recently approach [2] alters merely 16 pixels to ensure
misclassification on 32×32 images.
Attacking a straw-man. On the other hand, such adversarial
learning risks need to be put into perspective. Still we are
less clear how realistic the discovered threats could be, given
that most of them are reliant on a white-box assumption
about the target (the FR system they aim at), that is, the
availability of full information about the target’s parameters.
In practice, however, an industry-grade system’s parameters
are often commercial secret and cannot be easily acquired by
unauthorized parties.
A more realistic way to understand a DL system’s security
properties is the black-box approach, in which the adversary
queries the target, utilizes the features inferred through the
queries to learn a substitute model and then searches for the
adversarial examples that also work on the target model. Such
an approach is based upon transferability of adversarial exam-
ples across different models [13]: some examples mislabeled
by one DL model are also found to be misclassified by another.
A direct attempt to transfer adversarial examples through an
ensemble learning [13] was found to be less effective. To
ensure a high transferability, more recent approaches aggres-
sively query the target to obtain adequate input-output samples
for accurately simulating the target model. As a prominent
example, a recent black-box attack needs to interact with the
target for at least 1,000 times [17].
With all the progresses being made, a big gap still exists
between hypothetic attacks proposed and credible threats with
practical impacts. Particularly, querying security-critical FR
systems is often expensive or even infeasible in practice:
e.g., an FR ATM can immediately alert a card holder to a
potential fraud once an impersonation attempt fails, making
further probes less likely to continue. Another problem of prior
transferability studies is the simple dataset used to train their
models, e.g., the MNIST database [12] includes only tens of
thousands of images for recognizing ten handwritten digits. A
real-world FR system, however, is typically trained over tens
or even hundreds of millions of images for identifying millions
of identities. Less clear is whether what is learned from such
small-scale studies over toy examples is indeed applicable to
real FR systems.
Cross-class transferability. To better understand the security
guarantee of real-world FR systems, we revisited transfer-
ability in our research, assuming that the adversary cannot
get any feedback from the target model and has limited
resources. In our study, we trained multiple common deep
neural networks (DNN), including VGG, GoogLeNet and
ResNet, and evaluated the transferability of adversarial exam-
ples across these models using the standard ensemble learning
based attack reported in the prior research [13], under various
settings (shadower substitute networks, different structures and
fewer data) to simulate a resource-constrained attacker. This
research sheds new light on transferability: e.g., for ResNet,
the transferability from a 50-layer substitute to a 101-layer
target is about 16.8%, compared with 24.6% between the 101-
layer substitute and the same target, in an impersonation attack.
More interesting is the significant impact of training data sizes:
the transferability has dropped from 24.6% in an impersonation
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attack to 14.5% when the substitute was trained on a dataset
one order of magnitude smaller than that of the target, and
further to 7.1% for a training set two orders of magnitude
smaller. Intuitively, substitutes learned with fewer data or a
shallower model would have a looser boundary and thus is
less likely to ensure a misclassification on the target (which is
better trained with more data). Overall, we only witnessed a
limited success on transferability, particularly when it comes to
the impersonation attack: about 20% under different settings.
Our work. To attack an industry-grade FR system without
querying it, a set of high-quality substitute models need to be
built to find common defects of the DNN models similar to or
even better trained than the target model. However, construct-
ing such substitute models is hard, particularly with limited
resource. In our research, we studied what the adversary could
do to narrow this gap and enhance his odds of success. A
unique observation we have is that even though the target
model generally has a more precise decision boundary, the
substitute model could still partially approach this boundary
in some regions: for example, a criminal may leveraging a
large number of his own and his victim’s photos to boost the
substitute model’s accuracy with regard to the identification
of (just) these two individuals, for the purpose of finding the
right makeup to cheat an FR ATM into authenticating him as
the victim. This attack, which we call Asymmetric Cross-Class
Image Transfer or EXCIT, is found to be completely feasible
in our research, due to a new property called Nearly Local
Linearity (NLL) discovered in our study.
More specifically, under a well-trained DL model, the
difference between a pair of images’ representations (i.e., the
Cosine distance between the embedding vectors produced by
the DL model) should be nearly linear to their similarity
as seen by human eye: in other words, when these images
become increasingly dissimilar, the difference between their
representations grows large proportionally. This NLL property,
as discovered in our research, can be approximated during the
training process of our substitute models: using our synthe-
sized additional images of victim and the attacker himself,
we minimize the gap between the distances across different
representations produced by the model and what are supposed
to be according to NLL. We found that such a model can
effectively simulate a better-trained target model’s behaviors
around the images of interest to the attackers. (For the sake
of simplicity, in the following article, we call these images as
the Points of Interesting or PoIs.)
In our research, we implemented EXCIT and, first, eval-
uated it under the settings of our transferability study. We
observed that the new technique vastly enhanced the effec-
tiveness of the attacks, particularly for impersonations, from
20% (based upon the prior attack [13]) to 50%, even when
the adversary only used 10% of the training data and half
of the layers (thus saving the training time by 5 orders of
magnitude). Further we ran this approach against industry-
grade systems including ColorReco, Facevis, Face++ and
SenseTime (the SenseTime system trained over tens of millions
of photos). Using 4 million images collected from the web
(the largest scale for this type of research), EXCIT was found
to significantly elevate the chance of successful cross-model
attacks compared with the naive query-free attack [13], from
11% to 62%, without any communication with the target model
before the attack.
Contributions. The contributions of the paper are outlined as
follows:
• The NLL property and understanding of transferability. Our
large-scale study reveals a fact that the training data size can
have on the successful transferring of an adversarial instance
from one model to another. More importantly, we discovered
the nearly linear relation between input images and their
representations (in terms of their differences) under an ideal
model, which enables our query-free attack and might lead to
better understanding of the fundamental defects in DL models.
• New techniques for query-free attacks. Based upon the new
discovery, we designed a new attack technique that finds ad-
versarial examples against a well-trained target model without
querying the target and using limited resources. At the center
of the technique is leverage of additional synthesized images
of victim and attacker and the NLL property to train substitute
models that are capable of simulating the target model around
PoIs, even when the adversary only possess a small amount of
training data and much less computing resources. This makes
an important step toward understanding the realistic threat of
adversarial learning.
• Implementation and evaluation. We implemented the tech-
nique and evaluated it over industry FR systems.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Deep Learning and Face Recognition
Deep Neural Network. Deep Neural Network (DNN) is a
function that projects the input domain onto an output domain
for classification and other purposes. Following the prior
research [15], we formulate the DNN for image processing
as below:
F (x) = softmax(Z(x)) = y
where x is the image serving as the input to the DNN, y is
its output, typically a vector of probabilities for the image to
be in different classes, and Z(x) is the “logits”, the output of
the layer right before the “softmax” layer, and, in other words,
Z(x) is the unscaled probability vector serving as the inputs
to the “softmax” layer.
In all our concerned DNN structures (VGG, GoogLeNet
and ResNet), the Z(x) can be further decomposed as:
Z(x) = T ◦R(x)
where R(x) is the feature vector of the input x extracted by our
DNN model. Specifically, the DNN projects x onto a feature
space and R(x) is the representation of the x in that space.
T (·) is the classification function that transforms R(x) into
“logits”. Usually, T (·) is a linear mapping function and has
the form of
T (R(x)) = WCR(x) +BC
where WC is the weight matrix and BC is the bias vector.
A well-trained DNN is characterized by its capability to
generate similar representations for similar inputs. This avoids
the pitfall when two similar inputs actually are mapped to two
very different representations and as a result, are assigned into
two different classes. Note that in our research, the similarity
between two representations is measured by the cosine distance
between them.
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Face recognition systems. Since the introduction of deep Con-
volutional Neural Networks (CNN) [11], FR technologies have
been evolving rapidly. As a prominent example, DeepFace [28]
close the gap between the recognition capabilities of human
beings and machines. Further, DeepID3 [25] attained a 99.53%
accuracy on the LFW dataset [6] that exceeds the human
performance, 99.2%. More recently, FaceNet [22] exploited
a deep architecture to achieve a 99.63% accuracy on the same
dataset.
More generically in the image processing area, three DNN
models have been extensively used. VGG-16 [24] running 16
cascaded convolution layers was reported to achieve state-of-
the-art recognition results in the ImageNet Large-Scale Visual
Recognition Challenge 2014 [20] (ILSVRC-2014), together
with GoogLeNet [26], which involves 22 layers and Inception
architectures invented by Google for combining information
from multi-views. Empowered by the pervasiveness of GPU
and Batch Normalization technologies [8], ResNet-152 [5]
winning the ILSVRC-2015 classification task is armed with
152 layers and capable of transferring shadow features to deep
layers.
B. Adversarial Learning
The potential of deploying DNN to real-world systems
(e.g., self-driving cars) faces the security challenges of adver-
sarial learning, an attack that manipulates the inputs to a DNN
to cause misclassification. This attack was first discussed by
Szegedy et al. [27], who pointed out the existence of adversar-
ial examples, i.e., perturbed input x′ is similar to the original
input x but misclassified by the DNN into a different category.
Such attacks can be targeted or not. In the non-targeted case,
the attacker seeks adversarial examples that are misclassified
into any categories except the one they belong to. For instance,
the adversary wants to fool the face recognition system by
slightly changing his face and making it is misclassfied as
other people. Formally speaking, the attacker changes facial
appearance from x to x′, and causes the missed classification
result: argmaxi F (x
′)i 6= argmaxi F (x)i. Here, the DNN
output F (x) is a vector that describes the probabilities for the
input x belonging to different individuals. In a targeted attack,
the adversary intends to impersonate a given individual t, by
seeking a makeup x′ causing argmaxi F (x
′)i = t. As we focus
on FR problems, we will use dodging attacks to represent non-
targeted attacks and impersonation attacks to represent targeted
attacks.
Attack methods. To find adversarial examples, people need to
define the similarity between two images (the inputs), x and
x′, based upon a distance metric. Prior research on adversarial
learning uses the Lp distance, with p being 0, 2 or ∞:
‖x− x′‖p = (
n∑
i=1
|xi − x′i|p)
1
p .
Here xi − x′i is the subtraction between the i-th pixel of two
input images.
Minimizing the L0 distance, we can get x′ with the smallest
number of pixels differing from those on the original input x.
The Jacobian-based Saliency Map (JSMA) [18] is an attack
optimized under the L0 distance. It iteratively picks pixels that
have the most impact on the results and modifies them, until
either a given threshold (an upper bound for the number of
pixels) is reached or an adversarial example is found.
Minimizing the L2 distance, we can obtain x′ that has the
least modification, in terms of Euclidean distance, across all
pixels on x and x′. The first attempt using this distance is
L-BFGS [27] that minimizes the L2 distance under the box-
constraint, i.e., x′ ∈ [0, 1]n, where n is the number of pixels.
It exploited the classical gradient descend method to find the
optimal solution with a pre-defined learning rate lr:
x′ = x+ lr · 5xF (x), (1)
Minimizing L∞ distance, we can find x′ with the smallest
maximum-changes to the pixels. Under this distance, the
optimization algorithm seeks a region of pixels with similar
intensities to modify. An example of the prior attack is Fast
Gradient Sign Method (FGSM) [4], which iteratively updates
x′ to produce an adversarial example by stepping away a small
stride along with the direction of 5xF (x′).
In our research, we chose L2 distance, because it is a
continuous metric and also sensitive to the change that happens
to any pixels in the input images. By comparison, L0 (number
of different pixels) is not continuous and L∞ (maximum pixel
difference) might not capture a small modification on the input.
Transferability. As mentioned earlier, transferability is the key
to practical adversarial learning, when the adversary cannot
directly access the internal parameters of the target model.
Prior research [13] demonstrates that around 20% adversarial
examples discovered from one of the three models (ResNet-
152, VGG-16 and GoogLeNet) are also misclassified by other
two models under a dodging attack. A more recent study [16]
further shows that transferability can happen even across dif-
ferent machine learning techniques: DNN, Logistic Regression
(LR), Support Vector Machine (SVM) and Nearest Neighbors
(kNN). Particularly, more than 60% of adversarial examples
discovered in LR or SVM were found to be still effective
on the other model. When it comes to the impersonation
attack, also 20% adversarial examples were reported to work
across different DNN models [13]. These examples were found
using an ensemble-based approach that descends along the
summation of the gradients of several models.
A primary limitation of these prior studies is that they are
all based upon “less-categories” datasets, such as ILSVRC-
2012 including 1000 categories. Compared with the industry-
grade FR systems such as Facevisa, ColorReco, which are
trained to classify tens or even hundreds of thousands of
identities, what has been learned from these studies can be
less conclusive. Also importantly, the prior research either
considers that the substitute models are built upon similar
or even identical datasets as the target, or at the very least,
assumes that the adversary is capable of continuously querying
the target model to collect data (query results) for training the
substitute models. As discussed earlier, in many cases, these
assumptions are still a far from reality. Our research instead
looked into the transferability over a large dataset, when the
adversary cannot query the target and has limited resource to
train his substitute models.
C. Threat Model
We consider an adversary that intends to perform a dodging
attack or a impersonation attack on a target FR model that
he cannot query. The adversary does not have access to the
internal parameters of the target but has limited information
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about its architecture (e.g., ResNet, VGG or GoogLeNet) and
its depth (e.g., about 100 layers for ResNet, though the precise
number of layers is still unknown to him). All such information
about a commercial system is often made available through
various public sources, such as research papers (e.g., the design
of Face++ was described in the paper [3]), technical reports
and other online documents.
The target model studied in our research is assumed to be
trained over a large amount of data, tens or even hundreds
of millions of images, as those commercial FR systems are.
On the other hand, the adversary does not have that level
of resources, though we do assume that he can still acquire
millions of images publicly available online, as we did in the
study. Further, the adversary can obtain thousands of images
of himself and the victim he want to impersonate, and also
sufficient resources from the cloud to train the substitute
model over the data. We believe that these assumptions are all
realistic, as demonstrated in our research: particularly, all the
computing power required for training our attack model can
be purchased from Amazon at an approximate cost of 10,000
dollars. Specially, if the adversary can not obtain sufficient
images of the victim from the Internet, they can follow the
victim and record videos to get enough images that are taken
in various scenarios and from different angles.
III. UNDERSTANDING TRANSFERABILITY ACROSS
ASYMMETRIC MODELS
To understand whether a DNN model is vulnerable to
query-free attacks, we need to find out the challenges in
simulating the target model’s behaviors, under the limited
resources and information. For this purpose, we conducted the
largest study on transferability, using a dataset with 4 million
images. Our research reveals the importance of training data
size to a successful cross-model attack.
A. Settings
Our study utilized MegaFace Challenge 2 [14], a dataset
including 672K identities and their above 4 million photos, and
Caffe [9], an open-source deep learning framework, to train FR
DNN models in our experiments. All such experiments were
conducted on a 8-GPUs server with each GPU armed with
12GB memory.
In our studies, we assume our target model is F ∗(·) and
it outputs a vector F ∗(x), for a input image x. Our study
covers both dodging attacks and the impersonation attacks.
The criteria for a successful dodging attack is:
find x′
s.t. ‖x− x′‖2 ≤ θ
argmaxi F
∗(x′)i 6= o
where o is the owner of x, o = argmaxi F
∗(x)i. The criteria
for a successful impersonation attack is:
find x′
s.t. ‖x− x′‖2 ≤ θ
F ∗(x′)t > 0.5
where t is the victim to be impersonated and we ensure t 6=
o. For the better understanding, during later paragraphs, we
may use “subject” to indicate the one whose identity is o and
“victim” to indicate the one whose identity is t.
In following studies, we will use 4 levels of training dataset
to train our models. For the sake of clarity, we list them in
Table I.
TABLE I: Different levels of dataset.
Short name Images Identities
L1 6× 104 104
L2 6× 105 105
L3 19× 105 3× 105
L4 40× 105 6.4× 105
Besides, we say the transferability between two models
is 50% which means there are 50% adversarial examples
found on one model that can successfully fool both two
models. Sometimes we may use “success rate” to replace
transferability.
In this study, we use C&W approach [2], the best method
as we know, to find adversarial examples. It optimizes the
following objective function:
minimize
1
2
‖tanh(w)− x‖22 + c · f(tanh(w)).
For the dodging attack, f is defined as
f(x′) = max(Z(x′)o −max{Z(x′)i : i 6= o},−κ).
For the impersonation attack, f becomes
f(x′) = max(max{Z(x′)i : i 6= t} − Z(x′)t,−κ).
Here, the adversarial example we found is x′ = tanh(w∗),
where w∗ is the optimal solution of above function. In that
function, c is a parameter that balances the importance of two
components, the first component minimizing the L2 distance
between the adversarial example x′ and the original image x,
the second component modeling the goal of this attack, either
dodging or impersonation. Also, κ is a threshold indicating
when the attack goal is achieved. We set c = 20, κ = 20 for
both the dodging attack and the impersonation attack in our
experiments.
And we further improve the performance of above function
by exploiting the standard ensemble-based approach. Specif-
ically, we will use K = 4 substitutes and assemble them to
solve the following function:
minimize
1
2
‖tanh(w)− x‖22 + c ·
K∑
k=1
f (k)(tanh(w)).
(2)
where f (k)(·) is the k-th substitutes.
B. Impacts of Structural Features
Structures. As mentioned earlier, to understand the impacts
of DNN structures on transferability, we looked into the three
most prominent structures: VGG1, GoogLeNet 2 and ResNet3.
In this study, for every structure, we trained a target model on
a L2 dataset and four substitutes on four L2 datasets. And, we
ensure that these five training datasets are not overlap with each
1https://github.com/davidgengenbach/vgg-caffe
2https://github.com/BVLC/caffe/tree/master/models/bvlc-googlenet
3https://github.com/KaimingHe/deep-residual-networks
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other except for the images of subjects and victims involved
in attacks.
Over these models, we analyzed the transferability of
the dodging and impersonation attacks, using an ensemble
learning method that integrates adversary examples found in
4 substitutes trained independently to find images causing
the target model to misclassify. More specifically, in dodging
attacks, we built an attacking set containing 635 images from
100 identities, and in impersonation attacks, we use 600 image-
pairs to construct the attacking set. Each image-pair contains
two images from two different identities. To be noticed that
the attacking set were inside the training sets of both the target
model and substitute models.
The experiment results are presented in Table II. As we can
see from the table, for dodging, we observed a transferability
about 95%, and for impersonation, it became 20%. This
finding is pretty much in line with what is reported in the
prior research, indicating that transferring adversarial examples
across different models are feasible, though less effective in the
case of impersonation.
Depths. Further we looked into the impacts of depths on trans-
ferability. For this purpose, we utilized ResNet, since the depth
of its structure can be easily adjusted. More specifically, we
built 4 ResNets with 50, 65, 80 and 101 cascaded convolutional
layers respectively. The compositions of their structures are
presented in Table II. Using these structures, we also trained
models to repeat experiments that have been done to inspect the
impact of different structures (four substitute models trained
on four L2 training sets to attack the target model trained on
L2 training set).
In this study, we ran those models as substitutes to attack
the target (ResNet-101), both dodging and impersonation. As
expected, the complexity of the network (its depth) indeed
affects transferability: more layers make the DNN more capa-
ble and enhance transferability. Again, transferability tends to
be low for the impersonation attack, around 16% when using
ResNet-50 to attack ResNet-101.
C. Impacts of Data Size
Training size and transferability. An important observation
is that a real-world adversary typically cannot get as many
photos as a large organization uses to train its industry-grade
FR system. An important question we were asking is what
impacts a relatively smaller dataset could have on the chance
of a successful cross-model attack. For this purpose, we trained
VGG, GoogLeNet and ResNet-101 models on three levels of
datasets: L1, L2 and L3. Again, all these individuals were
randomly drawn from our dataset and we made sure that
there was no overlap across substitutes’ training set and target
model’s training set. In this study, we utilized substitute models
of the same structure with the target model for both the
dodging attack and impersonation attack. The target model
is built upon a L3 training set. The results are presented in
Table IV. As we can see here, training data size turns out
to significantly affect transferability and such an influence
is also consistent across different structures. Compared with
the structural impacts, transferability became lower when we
reduced the data size from L3 to L2. Compared with the
impact of depth, the attack was less likely to succeed when
we downsized the size of training set (L3 to L2) than when
we removed layers (from 101 to 50).
Further, we trained four substitute models on four L1
training sets and use these substitute models to attack a model
that was trained on L2 dataset. This experiment’s results are
illustrated in the right column of Table IV. An interesting
observation is that the transferability from L1 models to L2
models actually is lower (14.5%) than that for L2 to L3
(17.5%), even though the difference in the training sets is even
larger in the latter case (13 × 105 images) than the former
(5.4 × 105 images). Intuitively, with the increase in training
set, a substitute model becomes closer to a perfect model
and adding more data then be less effective in improving
the model’s precision than the time when the model only
learns from a small size of training set and therefore much
less accurate. Further analysis of the observation leads to the
conclusion that the enhancement of transferability will slow
down when the data size goes up (see Appendix A).
Discussion. Our study shows that although both structural
features and the size of training set affect transferability,
apparently the impact of the latter is more prominent. In
practice, the structural information of many commercial FR
systems can often be found, from research articles, public
paper and other sources. On the other hand, a deeper network
with more data certainly need more computing resources to
train. For example, on our system with 8 GPUs, training a
ResNet-101 model took 9 hours for a L1 training set, while
only half of the time was needed for a 50-layer model over
the same set. Most importantly, collecting a large number of
high-quality images is often a challenge for the adversary: for
example, SenseTime Ltd’s model is reported to be built from
above 20M images and the dataset of this scale could not be
found on the Internet, up to our knowledge. Therefore, we
believe that whether transferability could be enhanced in the
presence of a relatively small set of training data is critical
question for assessing the practical impacts of adversarial
learning on FR systems.
Also to attack a real-world system without querying it, the
adversary needs to estimate his chance of success based upon
the features of a given adversarial example, for example, the
percentage of the pixels modified. This can not be easily done
since the adversary does not have access to the target system
and therefore cannot figure out the probability of success by
testing his adversarial examples on the target. However, our
study described above shows that the transferability between
the substitute models and the target model can actually be
gagged using the transferability between a target model learned
from a smaller dataset and smaller substitute models. This is
because the probability of success in the latter case is expected
to be higher than that in the former. A more formal analysis
of this observation is presented in Appendix A.
IV. QUERY-FREE ASYMMETRIC ATTACK
To enhance transferability, ideally we need to make the
substitute model very similar to or even more accurate than the
target model. Although this is nearly impossible for most real-
world adversaries, given their limited resources, particularly
a much smaller training set they are able to obtain, still
something can be done to narrow the gap between the two
models. A key observation is that a unique resource the
adversary often has is abundant photos of the subject (often
himself) in a dodging attack and also those of the victim in
an impersonation attack. Leveraging such images, we could
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TABLE II: Transferability among different structures. The number in every cell is the success rate corresponds to that using four
substitute models with row structure to attack the target model with the column structure.
ResNet-101 GoogLeNet VGG-16
Dodging Impersonation Dodging Impersonation Dodging Impersonation
ResNet-50 95.1% 16.8% - -
ResNet-65 95.6% 18.0% - -
ResNet-80 96.3% 23.2% - -
ResNet-101 98% 24.6% 96.7% 20.2% 96.4% 20.3%
GoogLeNet 95% 16.5% 97.8% 23.1% 94.6% 18.5%
VGG-16 93.4% 17% 94.4% 18.1% 97.2% 22.3%
TABLE III: Structures of different depths. ResNet structures
can be divided into 5 stages, starting with a convolution layer,
followed by four stages, each including a different number of
“bottleneck” blocks.
ResNet-50 ResNet-65 ResNet-80 ResNet-101
Stage 1 1 Conv 1 Conv 1 Conv 1 Conv
Stage 2 3 Blocks 3 Blocks 3 Blocks 3 Blocks
Stage 3 4 Blocks 4 Blocks 4 Blocks 4 Blocks
Stage 4 5 Blocks 10 Blocks 15 Blocks 22 Blocks
Stage 5 3 Blocks 3 Blocks 3 Blocks 3 Blocks
train a model biased toward the subject or the subject and
victim pair. Even though such a model may be overfitting and
therefore its overall accuracy could may be below that of the
target model, all we care about here is just the target model’s
behavior around the subject and/or the victim (PoIs), which
we could potentially simulate in the substitute models using
this resource (extra photos).
However, effective use of such resource turns out to be
challenging. Table V shows the experimental results when we
directly duplicate those photos of subjects and the victims
to the same size with the original dataset (L2 level). And
use the duplicated images and original images to enhance
the transferability under the VGG, GoogLeNet and ResNet
models in attacking the target models trained over L3 dataset.
From the table, we do not see a significant improvement in the
effectiveness of the attack, compared with those without such
data augmentation.
Intuitively, the subject and victim’s photos alone are in-
sufficient for simulating the relations established by a better
trained model between them and between the subject and other
identities in the dataset. Such relations need to be built upon
other images and the way a well-trained DNN maps the input
to feature vectors. Following we show how such relations can
be modeled using a new property discovered in our research,
called Nearly Local Linearity (NLL), the key technique behind
our EXCIT attack, which helps improving the substitute model
for simulating the target model’s behaviors around the subject
and victims, boosting the transferability from below 30%
(for impersonation) to above 60% on commercial systems
(Section V-C).
A. Nearly Local Linearity
A well-trained model will produce more accurate results
than the poor-trained model. However, this property is use-
less for obtaining better transferability. Thus, we need more
delicate findings.
Observation. The key idea is that the representations produced
by an ideal DNN model should be accurately model the human
perceptions: when two images look very different, the distance
between the representations should be large, and when the
images appear to be similar, the distance should become small.
So we built experiments to figure out how the representation
of a well-trained DNN model changes during the procedure
changing the input image from the subject to the victim. And,
to measure the changing, right metrics need to be chosen.
In our research, we found that L2 (as used in the prior
research [2]) and Cosine distances can serve these purposes.
In our research, we trained three ResNet-101 models on
three different datasets: L1, L2 and L4. From each dataset, we
selected, uniformly at random, 104 pairs of images (xa, xb),
with the images from two different identities (identity a
and identity b) in one pair. Then between each image pair
(xa, xb), we synthesized a series of 99 images by equidistant
interpolation. Formally, the k-th image can be represented as:
x(k) = xa +
k
100
(xb − xa)
Specially, x(0) = a and x(100) = b.
Then, we ran all three models on these interpolated images
to get their representations. Altogether, 106 representations
were produced from the 104 image pairs. Further we calculated
the mean for the Cosine distances between every x(k) and xa
as:
C¯a(k) = 10
−4∑
(xa,xb)
Ca(k)
where
Ca(k) = 1− cos(R(x(k)), R(xa))
After that, we compare C¯a(k) with the corresponding regu-
larized L2 distance L2(k) = ‖x(k) − xa‖2/‖xb − xa‖2. The
results are shown on Fig 1.
To more clearly demonstrate the different behaviors of
different models, on Fig 1, we also listed every model’s ξ,
the metric to measure the difference between the mean Cosine
distance curve and the diagonal y = x:
ξ2 = 10−2
100∑
k=1
(C¯a(k)− L2(k))2
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TABLE IV: Transferability among different levels of training set. The number in every cell is the success rate corresponds to
that using four substitute models trained on row settings to attack the target model trained on column settings.
L3 dataset L2 dataset
Dodging Impersonation Dodging Impersonation
ResNet-101
L3 dataset 98.8% 25.2% -
L2 dataset 81.3% 17.5% -
L1 dataset 34.5% 7.1% 71.2% 14.5%
GoogLeNet
L3 dataset 97.3% 24.1% -
L2 dataset 79% 16.2% -
L1 dataset 32% 5.1% 69.4% 13.3%
VGG-16
L3 dataset 97.5% 23.9% -
L2 dataset 77% 16.3% -
L1 dataset 32.3% 6.3% 66.7% 12.9%
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(a) ξ = 0.028, 0.018, 0.011 for models of L1,
L2 and L4 respectively.
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(b) ξ = 0.063, 0.047, 0.039 for models of L1,
L2 and L4 respectively.
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(c) ξ = 0.082, 0.053, 0.042 for models of L1,
L2 and L4 respectively.
Fig. 1: NLL property: From left to right, there are 3 figures showing the results of ResNet-101, VGG-16 and GoogLeNet models
respectively.
TABLE V: Transferability on naively augmented training set.
Use four L2 substitutes to attack L3 model. The number in the
bracket is the original transferability copied from Table IV.
Dodging Impersonation
ResNet-101 83%(81.3%) 18.2%(17.5%)
GoogLeNet 80.2%(79%) 15.8%(16.2%)
VGG-16 77.3%(77%) 16.8%(16.3%)
As we can see from the figures, the relation between the
L2 distance and the Cosine distance approaches linear with the
increase of the training data size. Particularly, it becomes al-
most linear for the ResNet-101 model trained on L4 dataset (4
million images of 6.4×105 identities), with ξ = 0.011. Under
the identical experimental settings, we observed the same L2
and Cosine distance relation in the VGG-16 and GoogLeNet
models. This indicates that the relations between the subject
and interpolated images, and between the representations of
them can be captured by this NLL property.
Concept. Formally, we define the Nearly Local Linearity
(NLL) as follows:
1− R(x(λ))·R(xa)‖R(x(λ))‖2‖R(xa)‖2 ≈ λ =
‖x(λ)−xa‖2
‖xb−xa‖2 (3)
where
x(λ) = λxa + (1− λ)xb, λ ∈ [0, 1]
B. The EXCIT Attack
The discovery of the Nearly Local Linearity property in
a well-trained DNN model enables us to train a substitute
model by not only leveraging the extra images of subjects
and victims but also integrate such images into the model
by approximating the relations between synthesized images
from those images and the existing images in the dataset. For
this purpose, we need to build a set of “transitional” images
as those interpolated images mentioned earlier, and redefine
the optimization goals when training the substitute model to
connect these images to others in an expected way. These are
the key steps for our EXCIT attack, as elaborated below.
Subject-oriented data augmentation. To synthesize “transi-
tional” images and enrich the training dataset, we designed a
subject-oriented data augmentation algorithm (see Algorithm
1). This algorithm follows a key rule is to keep balance.
Detailedly, the algorithm keeps balance in three levels: first, it
keeps the total number of synthesized images being similar
with the number of original images; second, it keeps the
number of synthesized images between every image-pairs
being the same; third, it uses the uniform distribution to control
the generation of λ. Thus, adversaries can use limited images
to synthesize as many as possible behaviors of a well-trained
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DNN model.
In our algorithm, again, o is the subject and t is the victim.
For the sake of simplicity, we set t = o to represent the
dodging attack. Our algorithm takes the original dataset D,
a subject-victim pair (o, t) and the number of images needed
to be synthesized between one image-pair m as its input and
outputs the augmented dataset Daug . In the rest of the paper,
we keep m being 10.
Algorithm 1: Subject-oriented data augmentation algo-
rithm.
Input: D, (o, t), m
Output: Daug
1 A = {xo : x ∈ D, argmaxi F (x)i = o};
2 B = {xt : x ∈ D, argmaxi F (x)i = t};
3 C = D −A⋃B;
4 if o = t then
5 n = 0;
6 end
7 else
8 n = |D|/m;
9 end
10 pairs = [];
11 for i = 1 to n do
12 randomly select a xa from A;
13 randomly select a xb from B;
14 pairs.append((xa,xb)) ;
15 end
16 for i = 1 to |D| − n do
17 randomly select a xa from A
⋃B;
18 randomly select a xb from C;
19 pairs.append((xa,xb)) ;
20 end
21 for (xa,xb) in pairs do
22 for i = 1 to m do
23 Sample λ from U(0, 1);
24 x(λ) = λxa + (1− λ)xb;
25 Daug = Daug ∪ {x(λ)};
26 end
27 end
28 Daug = Daug
⋃D;
Training NLL-enhanced substitutes. With enriched data, we
want to train a substitute model to approximate the NLL
property for a given identity-pair (o, t) (the subject and victim
pair). For this purpose, we first train our substitute model on
the original dataset D and fine-tune the substitute model on the
augmented dataset Daug . And the find-tuned model is expected
to be closer to or even surpass a better-trained model around
the PoIs, thus, which will elevate the transferability of the
adversary example our discovered.
Naturally, the standard “softmax” function was used as
the objective function to train our substitute models on the
original dataset. On the augmented dataset, we built a triplet
loss function according to the NLL: for a tuple (xa, x(λ), xb),
we set Ltri as:
Ltri = (Ca(λ)− λ)2 + (1− λ− Cb(λ))2
where
Cb(λ) = 1− R(x
(λ)) ·R(xb)
‖R(x(λ))‖2‖R(xb)‖2
However, Ltri can not be used alone, as it just control the
relations among R(xa), R(x(λ)) and R(xb) but dose not give
any constraints about the absolute values of R(xa), R(x(λ))
and R(xb) neither the relations among different R(x(λ)) in
different tuples. So using only the triplet loss may break some
valuable structures that have been learned from the original
dataset.
To solve this problem, we study what the F (x(λ)) should
be when the R(x(λ)) follows the NLL property. Here, we
directly give the conclusion and left the detailed deduction
in our Appendix B. For a tuple (xa, x(λ), xb), a well-trained
DNN model F ∗ will produce F ∗(x(λ)) in the following form:
F ∗(x(λ))(i) =

(1 + exp(2βλ− β))−1 , i = a
1− F ∗(x(λ))(a) , i = b
0 , others
(4)
To determine the value of β, we tested three ResNet-101
models that trained on L2, L3 and L4 datasets respectively.
The results are shown on Fig 2. According to the results, we
choose β = 4.5. The curve of F ∗(·) when β = 4.5 is also
shown on Fig 2.
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Fig. 2: DNN output’s patterns: the y-value is the value of the
a-th element in the output vector of DNN models.
Combining triplet loss and the results about the expected
output of a well-trained DNN, we obtain the objective function
for fine-tuning our substitute models as:∑
(xa,x(λ),xb)
Ltri + Lsoft(0) + Lsoft(λ) + Lsoft(1)
(5)
where
Lsoft(λ) = −
∑
i F
∗(x(λ))i log(F (x(λ))i)
Here, Lsoft is the Kullback–Leibler divergence between F (x)
and F ∗(x). And, indeed, Lsoft can be simplified to contain
just two terms about the a-th and b-th elements of the output
vector.
Finding adversarial examples. After generating multiple
substitute models enhanced by the NLL property, we need
to effectively assemble them to find transferable adversarial
examples. The first question is how to assemble the gradients.
The standard approach is to average the gradients discovered
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from individual substitute model (Eq 2). However, we found
a way to outperform the standard approach by computing
a weighted average gradients and clip it according to the
agreement. The details are listed in Algorithm 2.
Algorithm 2: Gradients assembling algorithm.
Input: {R(k)(·)}, w, xt
Output: g˜
1 x′ = tanh(w);
2 K = |{R(k)(·)}|;
3 for k = 1 to K do
4 αk = 1− cos(R(k)(x′), R(k)(xt));
5 gk = −‖R(k)(x′)‖2 5w cos(R(k)(x′), R(k)(xt));
6 end
7 g˜ =
∑
k αkgk/
∑
k αk;
8 for i = 1 to Dim(w) do
9 set(i) = {g1(i), g2(i), ..., gK(i)};
10 pi = mean(set(i));
11 qi = std(set(i));
12 end
13 maxp = max({pi});
14 for i = 1 to Dim(w) do
15 if p2i /qi ≤ 0.3maxp then
16 g˜(i) = 0;
17 end
18 end
Based on previous knowledge, if an adversarial example
which representation is very close, in the terms of Cosine
distance, to the representation of the target image, this example
will be classified as the target’s identity. So, we want to find
an adversarial example that can simultaneously shrink the
Cosine distance to a vary small value in all of our substitute
models. Thus we make heavier for those weights of models
in which current modification can hardly shrink the Cosine
distance and loose those weights of models in which the
current modification has already got a small Cosine distance.
This weighting operation have been done in the part before the
7-th line of the algorithm. The rest of the algorithm tries to
clip those gradients in such dimensions where our substitute
models do not agree on the direction. More specifically, in
these dimensions the variance of gradients from our substitutes
is large or the mean is small. In the favor of large mean value,
we use mean(·)2/std(·) to measure the agreement in every
dimension and set the bar to be 0.3maxp.
To be noticed is that the derivate of Cosine distance is:
5x cos(x, x′) = 1‖x‖2 (
x′
‖x′‖2 −
x
‖x‖2 cos(x, x
′))
So, in our searching algorithm, we regularized the derivate
by multiplying the corresponding L2 norm, ‖R(k)(x′)‖2 (the
5-th line), which can accelerate the decreasing of the Cosine
distance.
The second question is how to find an adversarial example
with small modification. To solve this problem, we designed
the Algorithm 3, inspired by the success of multi-step search-
ing algorithm.
Our searching algorithm is a multi-step algorithm that
enlarges the modification limitation δ step by step. In each
Algorithm 3: Searching adversarial example algorithm.
Input: K, {R(k)(·)}, xo, xt
Output: x′
1 δ = 1;
2 w = arctanh(xo);
3 c¯ = K−1
∑
k cos(R
(k)(tanh(w)), R(k)(xt)) ;
4 while c¯ < 0.8 do
5 for i = 1 to Θ do
6 ∆ = ‖tanh(w)− xo‖2 ;
7 gw = 5w∆ ;
8 gc = g˜(w, xt, {R(k)(·)}) ;
9 g = exp(∆− δ)gw + exp(3− c¯)gc ;
10 w = w − lr × g;
11 update c¯ ;
12 end
13 δ + + ;
14 end
15 x′ = tanh(w);
step, the algorithm tries Θ = 1000 times to find the optimal
solution w to minimize the following objective function:
exp(∆− δ) + η · exp(1− c¯) (6)
where η we chose is exp(2) which ensure that even in the
extreme case where c¯ = 1 and ∆ = δ the parameter in front of
gc is still about 7 times larger than the parameter in front of gw.
Another advantage of the objective function is that it enforces
the algorithm fast decreasing the 1 − c¯ when ∆ is small and
bouncing around border when ∆ is near to the modification
limitation.
C. Analysis
To find out how EXCIT enhances the transferability in a
query-free, black-box attack, we analyzed our implementation
using a ResNet-101 model trained on L3 dataset as the target
model, and a set of ResNet-101 models trained on L2 dataset
(no overlap with the target’s training set except the subjects
and victims) as substitute models. Specifically, in the dodging
attacks, the attacking set we used is the same with the attacking
set mentioned in Section III-B, that contains 100 identities and
their 635 images. In the impersonation attacks, we selected
600 image-pairs from 10 identity-pairs (subject-victim). For
all identities involved in impersonation attacks, we ensure that
each of them have at least 100 images in the Megaface dataset.
Under both attack settings, four substitute models were trained
using EXCIT method and on augmented dataset, and the target
model was attacked by the adversarial example found by these
four substitute models. We compare the results with the results
of previous studies (Section III) and the analysis is following.
Transferability. As we can see from Fig 3 and Fig 4, in
both attacks, EXCIT improved the transferability, which were
evident for dodging (from 81.2% to 89.6%) and dramatic
for impersonation (from 17.5% to above 49.8%). Interesting
here is that for the dodging attack, our approach is close to
the attack using the substitute models trained on the same
level dataset with the target model, indicating that our EXCIT
model is actually effective in recognizing the subject. This
is further supported by the findings for the impersonation
attack, in which none of the substitute models without the
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NLL enhancement could come even close to our performance,
even for those as well-trained as the target model. Actually,
even for a ResNet-101 trained on L3 dataset, we found that
our substitute models got a transferability of 49.8%.
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Fig. 3: Dodging performance: The left figure shows the distri-
bution of modifications made by approaches with and without
NLL enhance. The right figure shows the transferabilities of
them.
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Fig. 4: Impersonation performance: The left figure shows the
distribution of modifications made by approaches with and
without NLL enhance. The right figure shows the transfer-
abilities of them.
TABLE VI: Impersonation transferability of NLL-enhanced
approach on different structures. The number in the bracket
is the transferability using substitute models trained on L3
datasets.
ResNet-101 GoogLeNet VGG-16
with NLL 49.8% (72.1%) 46.8% 43.5%
without NLL 17.5% (25.2%) 16.2% 16.3%
Further our study shows that EXCIT also works on other
DNN structures: we use the same setting (four L2 substitute
models to attack L3 target model) to test the effectivity of
EXCIT on VGG-16 and GoogLeNet structures, and found that
(Table VI) both attacks achieved around 45% transferability,
way above the 16% reported in previous data-size study
(Section III-C).
Distance from the subject. Without querying the target,
naturally the adversarial examples discovered by EXCIT tend
to be farther away from the original image. What we want
to know, however, is for a given distance from the subject,
whether the adversarial examples found by our approach
still have a higher probability of success, compared with the
attack without the NLL enhancement. For this purpose, we
use four substitute models trained on L2 datasets to attack
the target model trained on L3 dataset, and compare both
methods’ average transferability under various L2 distances.
The results are given in Table VII. A more detailed study, by
restricting the searching space within a certain radius is given
in the Appendix C. From these results, we observe that NLL
improves the transferability in every distance.
TABLE VII: Transferability under different distance con-
straints.
< 10 < 15 < 20
Dodging with NLL 87.7% 88.3% 89.6%
Dodging without NLL 79.5% 81.2% 81.2%
Impersonation with NLL 50.5% 47.2% 49%
Impersonation without NLL 14.5% 17.5% 17.5%
Training cost. To understand how EXCIT helps a resource-
limited adversary, we evaluated the training cost of substitute
models over our 8-GPU server (with the 12GB memory for
each GPU). As illustrated in Table X, it took about 200 hours
to train a ResNet-101 on L3 dataset and more than 500 hours to
build the model on L4 dataset, while constructing a substitute
models on L2 dataset used 75 hours. Note that we could fully
parallelize the training of 4 substitute models, but could not
do this for a target model over the same amount of computing
resources, due to the communication overheads.
To further analyze the cost EXCIT could reduce, we trained
four substitute models of ResNet-50 and four of ResNet-101
on L1 datasets to perform impersonation attacks against the
target ResNet-101 models trained on L3 and L4 datasets. As
we can see in Tabel VIII, with the small amount of training
data, our approach elevated the transferability of these attacks
to 30-40% for target model trained on L3 datasets and around
20% for the target model trained on L4 dataset, while the
training time stayed at 5 to 9 hours per substitute model.
TABLE VIII: Impersonation transferability with NLL-
enhanced approach using L1 models as substitutes. Cell (i, j)
is the result of using model i to attack model j.
L3 L4
ResNet-50 L1 38.5% 16.8%
ResNet-101 L1 44.2% 23.2%
Also we compared the efficiency of our approach against
the attacks without the NLL enhancement. In the latter case,
the only way to improve the transferability is to train more
substitute models to find their common adversary examples.
In our study, we built three experiments using 4, 8 and 16
substitute models respectively, each model trained on a L1
dataset with ResNet-101 structure. In these experiments, the
target model is trained on L4 dataset and also with ResNet-
101 structure. The results of the standard ensemble method
over these models are presented in Table IX. As we can see
here, when attacking the L4 target, even with 16 substitutes,
the attack could not achieve the same level of transferability
as the 4 NLL-enhanced substitutes, even the substitutes with
only 50 layers. In this case, the cost of EXCIT, in terms of
training time, is no more than 16.8% of the direct attack (with
16 substitutes).
V. EVALUATION ON REAL-WORLD SYSTEMS
We evaluated our approach, EXCIT, on four real world
systems. Three of them are online, with APIs available for the
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TABLE IX: Impersonation transferability of standard ensemble
method using four substitute models (no NLL) trained on L1
datasets.
4 models 8 models 16 models
7.2% 12.7% 16.5%
TABLE X: Cost of training different models.
Depth Dataset Time Memory
50 L1 5h 8x4.5G
101 L1 9h 8x6.5G
101 L2 75h 8x7.5G
101 L4 >500h 8x8G
public, and the last one is a commercial system without open
access, one of the products from SenseTime Ltd. We performed
both dodging and impersonation attacks against them. The
details of our experiments and our findings are elaborated
below.
A. Experimental Settings
Unlike the models built in our analysis, which were trained
over the subject and victim’s images and output a vector
specifying the possibility of the input image belongs to every
identity, a real world FR system takes two photos as inputs
and calculates a score about the similarity of the individuals
in these two photos. Here is how we determined whether an
adversarial example worked on the real world FR systems:
In a successful dodging attack, we expect that the target
system outputs a low score (< Thdod) for two images: one
is the subject’s original photo and the other is the adversarial
example generated by our approach from the original photo.
In a successful impersonation attack, the target system is
supposed to output a high score (> Thimp) for two images:
the victim’s photo and the adversarial example generated by
our approach from the subject’s image, indicating that they are
belong to the same individual. As usual, the thresholds Thdod
and Thimp are specified by the FR system.
In our experiments, we first trained 4 ResNet-101 models
on randomly sampled 3M photos from 600K identities in the
MegaFace Challenge 2 dataset4.
From all identities, we selected 10 individuals as the
subjects in our dodging attack. For the impersonation, we
sampled 10 subject-victim pairs. Every identity involved has at
least 100 images in the Megaface dataset. In the experiments,
we randomly chose 10 of each individual’s images for the
dodging attack and 10 photo-pairs for each subject-victim pair
to execute the impersonation attack. For each of these subjects
or subject-victim pairs, we used our method to augment the
dataset and fine-tuned the substitute models on this augmented
dataset.
B. Attack on Online APIs
The three online APIs attacked in our research are Col-
orReco5, FaceVisa6 and Face++7. The models behind these
4We did not use all 4M for each substitute in an attempt to make these
substitutes diverse.
5http://www.colorreco.com/faceCompare
6http://www.facevisa.com/web/index/demo
7https://www.faceplusplus.com/face-comparing/#demo
APIs were trained with a large amount of data. For example,
Face++ was built upon 5M photos of 20K identities [31] and
FaceVisa was upon 2M photos. Also they all demonstrated a
high recognition accuracy over the Labeled Faces in the Wild
(LFW) dataset [6]: 99.4% for ColorReco, 99.5% for FaceVisa
and 99.5% for Face++. In our experiments, we ran a python
script to automatically upload our test photo pairs to ColorReco
and FaceVisa. For Face++, we had to do it manually due to
the requirement of CAPTCHA solving.
The success rates of our attacks are presented in Table XI.
Note that in these experiments, the thresholds for different
APIs are different and defined by the APIs themselves. Be-
sides, we set that an attack failed if the target FR system could
not detect face from the adversarial example submitted, even
for the dodging attack. As we can see from the table, our
approach achieved a higher accuracy in the dodging attack,
compared with the attacks without the NLL enhancement
(Table VI). A much bigger boost, however, is observed for the
impersonation attack, in which EXCIT raised the success rates
for all three systems from around 20% to 69-85%. Fig 5 further
illustrates the distributions for the scores of our submitted
photo pairs.
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Fig. 5: Distributions of scores for impersonation attacks: from
left to right, they are the results of ColorReco, Facevisa and
Face++ respectively.
TABLE XI: Success rate against online APIs.
ColorReco Facevisa Face++
dodging 98% 96% 95%
Thdod 0.75 0.64 0.623
impersonation 74% 85% 69%
Thimp 0.80 0.74 0.691
C. Attack on Industrial System
Commercial FR systems are often better trained and more
capable than the free FR APIs, which are mostly used for
online demo. Such industry-grade systems are typically char-
acterized by a large number of layers, and being trained over
a massive amount of data on clusters of GPUs. The services
they provide are not open to the public and only available for
purchase. In our research, we obtained the commercial SDKs
from SenseTime Ltd. through our collaborations. SenseTime’s
products are known to be among the leading FR systems [25].
So the system we analyzed represents the state-of-the-art in
FR technologies. It was trained over 20M photos for 1M
individuals, using a ResNet-like model, though the details
of the structure are commercial secrets. The model tested
in our study was estimated to require at least 14,000 hours
(50 epochs) to train, over our GPU server. By comparison,
all 4 EXCIT substitutes used in our attack were trained for
2,500 hours in total. With less than 1/5 of the time spent
on training the models, our approach achieved a high success
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rate for the 100 individual selected for the dodge attack and
100 pairs for the impersonation attack: in the former case,
89% of transferability was achieved, compared to 70% without
the NLL enhancement, and the in the latter, we raised the
transferability from 11% to 62%. Fig 6 further shows examples
for the successful attacks. We have reported our findings to
SenseTime and are helping them improve their system.
Fig. 6: Successful impersonation attacks on SenseTime. The
three columns are the subject photos, our generated adversarial
examples and the target photos respectively. The modification
of the first case is 13.41 and the second case is 7.22.
VI. RELATED WORKS
Our approach utilizes a synthesized dataset to fine-tune
our substitutes, for the purpose of approximating the NLL
property at PoIs. Synthesized data have also been used in
the prior research [17], to support completely different tech-
niques and to different purpose. Specifically, the prior research
uses synthesized data to query the target model to train the
substitute (1000 times to achieve an 84.24% success rate in
transferring adversarial examples). This is exact the attack
scenario our query-free approach is designed to avoid. Without
communicating with the target model, the only thing we can
do is to build a substitute as well-trained as the target, so as
to captures their common structural weaknesses to enhance
transferrability. Such an attack is found to be completely
feasible through simulating the target’s behaviors around PoIs,
based upon the NLL property we discovered and additional
images collected from the victims and the attackers.
Our approach also exploited the ensemble method. The
original ensemble-based approach is proposed by Liu et
al. [13]. Their work focus on the transferability among DNN
models with different structures, whereas the data size is the
factor that really matters in face recognition domain, as have
been demonstrated before. Compared with them, our method
can increase the transferability from a model trained with
insufficient data to a model trained with plenty of data, which
goes beyond their method’s capability. Another ensemble
method is proposed by Sarkar et al. [21]. They trained a
DL model to find “universal” perturbations fooling all their
pre-trained target models. Particularly, their object function
combines both the sum of targets’ (mis)classification loss and
the scale of the finding perturbations. The difference from their
method is similar with above. In our attacking scenario, their
method may not work.
Concurrent to our work, mixup [30] also utilizes the
interpolated images to augment the dataset for optimizing
KL-divergence loss function. However, mixup labels F ∗(x(λ))
with λ, as we can see from Fig 2, which is just a rough
approximation of the DNN’s real output. In contrast, based
on the NLL, we deduce the real formation of the output (see
Eq 4) and further improve our data augmentation method
using this formation. Also, mixup is designed to improve
the classification accuracy while our method is meant to
transfer the NLL property across models. So we believe that
our approach is likely to perform better when it comes to
transferability, given our better prediction of the DNN outputs
(which mixup just uses a linear function to estimate).
VII. DISCUSSION
Understanding NLL. Unlike existing cross-model attacks,
EXCIT does not even interact with the target, so there is no
way for our approach to exploit the specific defects of the
target. The reason we can still find highly transferable exam-
ples is that by simulating better-trained models around PoIs,
our approach is likely to discover some common (potentially
structural) defects fundamental to a certainly type of DNN,
and in the meantime, avoid exploring the subspace unlikely to
contain adversarial examples, given the reduction of training-
specific weaknesses (e.g., lack of sufficient data) around PoIs.
Under an NLL-enhanced substitute, we could even discover
transferable examples with modifications are restricted to a
given facial region: e.g., around the eyes (Appendix D), which
allows the prior attack [23] (using printout glasses to evade
detection) to work in a query-free, black-box setting.
In the meantime, our understanding of transferability is still
limited. Still less clear are the questions such as whether there
exist adversarial examples inherent to certain DNN structures
or even the fundamental design of artificial neural networks.
Further studies on these issues are certainly important.
Our current definition of NLL describes a relation between
Cosine distance and the L2 distance. However, such a relation
may not be general, particularly when it comes to non-
FR problems: as an example, we found that although the
NLL-enhanced models still improve transferability over Ci-
far10 [10], a dataset for image classification, the enhancement
is less significant (Table XII). This could be attributed to the
unique features of FR: e.g., differences between two faces can
be added to another face to form a new face, which makes
the “transitional” images easy to construct; also FR tasks
are characterized by a large number of training categories,
compared with other tasks (e.g., 1K categories for ILSVRC
vs. 600K entities for Megaface), which forces the DNN model
to map input images to a high-dimensional sphere with a
maximum space utilization. All these features make NLL more
effective on the FR tasks. What is less clear, however, is how
to extend the concept to improve the transferability of other
tasks, which should be studied in future research.
Defense. Defensive distillation [19] has been demonstrated
to be effective against most of previous attacks. However,
as pointed out by Carlini et al [2], a modified version of
existing attacks will break them defense. We also found that
distillation does not work on EXCIT either: more specifically,
We implemented the defense on our L3 target model with
temperature T = 20, and ran four L2 substitute models to
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TABLE XII: Transferability on Cifar10. We used 4 substitutes
(ResNet-20) trained on 10K images to attack the target model
(ResNet-20) trained on 30K images.
Dodging Impersonation
with 100% 57%
without 100% 63%
attack it. The result is that distillation can only reduce our
transferability from 89.6% to 88.8%, for dodging, and from
49% to 45.6%, for impersonation.
Alternatively, we can consider to insert “secret” into the
commercial system. Specifically, train the system on a custom
dataset where all the photos are covered by a secret pattern.
Since queries are not supposed to be made to the target during
an attack, the secret added to a commercial system could help
mitigate the EXCIT threat. In general, however, defense against
adversarial learning is known to be hard [1]. Further research
is needed to find an effective way to defeat our attack.
Cost of the attack. As mentioned earlier, training the sub-
stitutes to attack SenseTime’s FR system took 2,500 hours
on our server. An estimate cost for such resources is about
10000 dollars on Amazon AWS. The computing time here
can be shortened through parallelization, since all 4 substitutes
can be trained together. Also, the computing cost could be
reduced when the adversary attempts to impersonate multiple
victims or hide multiple subjects. In this case, only one set
of substitutes need to be trained over our dataset, which can
later be augmented with NLL for different subjects or subject-
victim pairs to support dodging or impersonation attacks.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we present our new understanding of DNN-
based FR systems, in terms of their vulnerability to the
transferable attack under a resource-constrained adversary. Our
research shows that limited resources, particularly smaller
training sets, can have a significant impact on the effectiveness
of the attack. This is important since a real-world adversary
typically cannot query the target frequently and needs to build
substitutes as capable as, or even more powerful than the
target model under his limited resources. Narrowing such a
resource gap, however, turns out to be feasible through a
novel technique we developed. Specifically, we found that the
adversary could make an effective use of the extra information
(images) about subjects and victims in his possession, by
approximating the relations of these PoIs with other images in
the training set characterized by a Near Local Linearity (NLL)
property we discovered. As a result, we can grossly elevate
the transferability in both a dodging and an impersonation
attack by training NLL-enhanced models by nearly 50% in
attacking industry-grade systems. With our new techniques and
findings, still more effort needs to be made to better understand
transferability and mitigate the threat it poses.
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APPENDIX A
TRANSFERABILITY PREDICTION
Given an adversarial example discovered, the attacker
needs to have some idea how likely the example could also
mislead the target model. Also in the presence of multiple
examples, the most promising one would be given preference.
One way to estimate the transferability of an example is to
train multiple models as capable as the target, called target
simulators or simply simulators, run substitutes to attack them
and then collect the statistics about the relation between the
features of the adversarial examples discovered in substitutes
and the transferability of the examples. Given such a relation,
the attacker can look at the features of an example to esti-
mate the likelihood that it could fool the target. This simple
approach, however, does not work in practice, as we do not
have the resources (e.g., a large number of images) to build
such powerful simulators.
Therefore in our research, we took a different path includ-
ing three steps: firstly, we train simulators on the data we
have; secondly, we estimate the difference between simulators
and the target, thirdly, we plus the estimated difference to
our simulators’ outputs to predict the target’s output. In these
process, estimation the difference is challenge, as we don’t
know how the target model looks like. But we can know the
scale of the training set of the target model. Thus we built a
function g(mα,mβ) to estimate the difference between models
trained on mα images and mβ images. Specifically, our study
shows that when training data grows, the substitute becomes
similar to the target, and the impact of their data size difference
becomes less prominent. Next, plussing the average difference
to every simulator’s output, we derive what the target model
would output for adversarial examples and can choose the best
one with the largest likelihood that it will fool the target.
To build g(mα,mβ) measuring the difference between two
models trained on mα images and mβ images, we need to find
a “bridge” to connect them. A nature idea is leveraging their
loss that measures how far away they are from the perfect
model and further implementing the triangle inequality to
estimate the difference between themselves. While the classic
softmax loss is inappropriate here, cause it not satisfies the
triangle inequality. Thus we used the Cosine distance again. We
define the Cosine distance loss of a model R(·) as following:
Lcos(R) =
∑
a,b
lcos(a, b, R)
where lcos(a, b, R) =
{
1− |cos(R(a), R(b))|, same identity;
|cos(R(a), R(b))|, different identities. .
And we count the mean and the standard deviation of Cosine
distance loss for models trained on different data size. The
results are showed on Fig 7. Now, we can infer the mean (µβ)
10 12 14 16
log(# of photos)
0.08
0.1
0.12
0.14
0.16
M
ea
n 
Co
sin
e 
lo
ss
data
fitted curve
10 12 14 16
log(# of photos)
0.06
0.08
0.1
0.12
0.14
St
d 
of
 C
os
in
e 
lo
ss
data
fitted curve
Fig. 7: Cosines distance loss of models trained on different
size of data.
and the standard deviation (δβ) of the target model trained
on mβ photos, according to the fitted curve. Further, we
assume the target model’s and simulators’ losses obey the
normal distribution N (µβ , δ2β) and N (µα, δ2α) respectively,
and roughly estimate the difference by assuming it also obey
the normal distributionN (µβ−µα, δ2β+δ2α). Thus, for a certain
simulator R(·), we can calculate out what is the likelihood that
1−|cos(R(a), R(b))| plus the estimated difference will surpass
0.5 for dodging attack or lower than 0.5 for impersonation
attack.
TABLE XIII: Statistics of Lcos(Rmα)− Lcos(Rmβ ).
mα mβ µ δ
62258 1541811 0.0188 0.1176
62258 4019407 0.0371 0.1225
1541811 4019407 0.0163 0.1001
Besides, in Table XIII, we list true values of the distance
of some pairs of (mα,mβ), and observe that, along with the
increase of data size, the simulator becomes similar to the
target, and the impact of their data size difference becomes
less prominent (small µ and δ).
APPENDIX B
DEDUCTION OF EQUATION 4
For a DNN model,
Z(j)(x) = W
T
(j)R(x) +B(j)
And for an ideally-trained DNN model F ∗,
Z∗(xa)(u) = WT(u)R
∗(xa) = 0,∀u 6= a
R∗(xa) = tW(a), t ∈ R
as the perfection of the model. Thus, for a tuple (xa, x(λ), xb),
F ∗(x(λ))(a) =
exp(Z∗(a))
exp(Z∗
(a)
)+exp(Z∗
(b)
)
= 11+exp(Z∗
(b)
−Z∗
(a)
)
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Based on the NLL property, we know that
cos(R∗(x(λ)), R∗(xa)) = 1−λ and cos(R∗(x(λ)), R∗(xb)) =
λ hold true. So we get:
R∗(x(λ))TR∗(xa) = (1− λ)‖R∗(xa)‖2‖R∗(x(λ))‖2
R∗(x(λ))TR∗(xb) = λ‖R∗(xb)‖2‖R∗(x(λ))‖2
Using the results previously get we can also get:
W (a)TR∗(x(λ)) = ζaR∗(xa)TR∗(x(λ)),
where
ζa = ‖W (a)‖2/‖R∗(xa)‖2
So,
Z∗(a)(x
(λ)) = (1− λ)‖W(a)‖2‖R∗(x(λ))‖2
Using the same, we get:
Z∗(b)(x
(λ)) = λ‖W(b)‖2‖R∗(x(λ))‖2
As the conclusion,
Z∗(b)(x
(λ))− Z∗(a)(x(λ)) = αλ− β
where
α = ‖R∗(x(λ))‖2(‖W(b)‖2 + ‖W(a)‖2)
β = ‖R∗(x(λ))‖2‖W(a)‖2
Besides, for a ideally-trained DNN model, we can assume that
F ∗(x0.5)(a) = 0.5. From this assumption we can infer that
α = 2β, which is what we desired.
Combined, F ∗(x(λ))(a) = (1 + exp(2βλ− β))−1
APPENDIX C
PERFORMANCE IN DIFFERENCE DISTANCE
Without querying the target model, naturally the adversarial
examples discovered by EXCIT, through simulating a “better”
model, tend to be farther away from the subject. What we
want to know, however, is for a given distance constraint,
whether the examples found by our approach still have a higher
probability of success, compared with the attack without the
NLL enhancement. For this purpose, we need to modify the
objective function of the DNN to limit its search within a given
distance (in terms of L2 distance) constraint, as follows:
minimize exp(‖tanh(w)− x‖2 − γ) + f(w).
Here we use an exp function that penalizes the L2 distance
when exceeding γ. More specifically, we calculated its deriva-
tive as follows:
exp(L2 − γ) · tanh(w)− x‖ tanh(w)− x‖2 5w tanh(w) + 1 · 5wf(w)
where L2 represents ‖ tanh(w) − x‖2. As we can see here,
When L2 > γ, the component involving the exp function
grows quickly, moving the objective function away from the
optimality. Therefore, in the optimal situation, L2 should not
exceed γ much.
In our research, we evaluated our approach using the
objective function when γ = 5, γ = 20 and γ = 30,
and exploiting 4 EXCITs trained on 600K photos of 100K
identities to attack the target trained on 1.9M photos of 300K
identities. The results are presented in Fig 8 and Table XIV. As
we can see, under various distances, the adversarial examples
found by our approach are always much more transferable than
the one without the NLL enhancement. In the meantime, our
approach tends to pick up the examples away from the subject,
given the fact that the NLL property moves the decision
boundary of the substitute model (with regard to the subject
and the victim) closer to the ideal one, making it harder to find
the adversarial examples close to the subject’s image, though
once such an image is found, it is more likely to lead to a
successful attack.
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Fig. 8: Distributions of modifications under different γ.
TABLE XIV: Impersonation transferability of NLL-enhanced
approach under different distance constraints.
γ = 5 20 30
with NLL 6.3% 51.3% 74%
without NLL 3.8% 21.8% 49.5%
APPENDIX D
RESTRICT THE MODIFICATION TO CERTAIN REGION
The trivial method to restrict modifications within a certain
region is to quench those derivatives out of the region, while
finding the adversarial examples. However, in this setting,
finding adversarial examples becomes harder than before. So
it is need to totally release the constrain on the magnitude
of modifications. We demonstrate two examples restricting
modifications around eyes on Fig 9. We observe that the mod-
ifications become severe: the L2 distance between generated
adversarial example and the original photo of the first case is
24.63, and of the second case is 27.04.
Fig. 9: Successful impersonation attacks within restricted re-
gion.
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